rshness, which would suffice to render
their success doubtful. Let us therefore examine the conduct of the
_Trent_.

Some have thought to justify it, by observing that the vessel was going
from America. What does this matter? Neutrals are bound to act as
neutrals when they are going from a place as well as when they are
coming towards it. They might as easily take sides with one of the
belligerents by carrying despatches, for instance, designed to secure to
it aid, as by bringing it other despatches announcing that this aid was
forthcoming.

Others have based their arguments on the fact that the _Trent_ had
quitted a neutral port to repair to a neutral port. Again, a distinction
which proclamations of neutrality have never admitted, and which no
jurisprudence has endorsed to my knowledge. What does plain good sense
tell us, in fact? That your departure from a neutral port and your
destination to a neutral port do not hinder you in any way from serving
the belligerent whose despatches you have received, especially if these
despatches are on the way to solicit from a neutral country an alliance
or supplies of munitions of war.

The rights of neutrals demand to be preserved, in my opinion, and France
is interested in it more than any other nation. But these rights, let us
not fear to acknowledge, have for their fundamental condition, a _real_
neutrality. Now, you take it upon yourself, knowingly and willingly, to
carry despatches destined for a country to which it is a notorious fact
that one of the belligerents is looking for its only serious chances of
success. These despatches are drawn up, it may be, in this wise: "Let
vessels loaded with arms and ammunition leave Southampton or Liverpool
as quickly as possible and come to Charleston, where the cruisers are
now few in number; let expeditions be combined in such a manner as to
force the blockade; we are in need of their arrival in order to push our
army forward." Or else the despatches read: "Buy up the newspapers and
work on public opinion in the manufacturing districts. Let maritime
powers know that we will consent, if necessary, to cessions of territory
or protectorates; that, in any case, we will grant them exceptional
advantages if they protest against the blockade, if they disquiet our
enemy, if they seek a quarrel with him and draw off his attention to fix
it on, an eventual struggle with Europe. At the first step of this kind,
we will attempt an offensive mov