ear
principles of reason, approved by general consent and the common
sense of men, what other hopeful way is there of proceeding with
him, than pleasantly to explode his conceits? To dispute seriously
with him were trifling; to trifle with him is the proper course.
Since he rejecteth the grounds of reasoning, 'tis vain to be in
earnest; what then remains but to jest with him? To deal seriously
were to yield too much respect to such a baffler, and too much
weight to his fancies; to raise the man too high in his courage and
conceit; to make his pretences seem worthy the considering and
canvassing. Briefly, perverse obstinacy is more easily quelled,
petulant impudence is sooner dashed, sophistical captiousness is
more safely eluded, sceptical wantonness is more surely confounded
in this than in the simple way of discourse.

5. This way is also commonly the best way of defence against unjust
reproach and obloquy. To yield to a slanderous reviler a serious
reply, or to make a formal plea against his charge, doth seem to
imply that we much consider or deeply resent it; whereas by pleasant
reflection on it we signify the matter only deserves contempt, and
that we take ourselves unconcerned therein. So easily without care
or trouble may the brunts of malice be declined or repelled.

6. This may be allowed in way of counterbalancing and in compliance
to the fashion of others. It would be a disadvantage unto truth and
virtue if their defenders were barred from the use of this weapon,
since it is that especially whereby the patrons of error and vice do
maintain and propagate them. They being destitute of good reason,
do usually recommend their absurd and pestilent notions by a
pleasantness of conceit and expression, bewitching the fancies of
shallow hearers, and inveigling heedless persons to a liking of
them; and if, for reclaiming such people, the folly of those
seducers may in like manner be displayed as ridiculous and odious,
why should that advantage be refused? It is wit that wageth the war
against reason, against virtue, against religion; wit alone it is
that perverteth so many, and so greatly corrupteth the world. It
may, therefore, be needful, in our warfare for those dearest
concerns, to sort the manner of our fighting with that of our
adversaries, and with the same kind of arms to protect goodness,
whereby they do assail it. If wit may happily serve under the
banner of