them from swerving in particular cases from truth and
equity; so the tenor of their life did evidence that it was the
glory of God, the good of men, the necessity of the case, which
moved them to it. And of them also we may observe, that on divers
occasions (yea, generally, whenever only their private credit or
interest was concerned), although grievously provoked, they did out
of meekness, patience, and charity, wholly forbear reproachful
speech. Our Saviour, who sometimes upon special reason in His
discourses used such harsh words, yet when He was most spitefully
accused, reproached, and persecuted, did not open His mouth, or
return one angry word: "Being reviled, He did not," as St. Peter,
proposing His example to us, telleth us, "revile again; suffering,
He did not threaten." He used the softest language to Judas, to the
soldiers, to Pilate and Herod, to the priests, etc. And the
apostles, who sometimes inveigh so zealously against the opposers
and perverters of truth, did in their private conversation and
demeanour strictly observe their own rules, of abstinence from
reproach: "Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we suffer
it;" so doth St. Paul represent their practice. And in reason we
should rather follow them in this their ordinary course, than in
their extraordinary sallies of practice.

In fine, however in some cases and circumstances the matter may
admit such exceptions, so that all language disgraceful to our
neighbour is not ever culpable; yet the cases are so few and rare in
comparison, the practice commonly so dangerous and ticklish, that
worthily forbearing to reproach doth bear the style of a general
rule; and particularly (for clearer direction) we are in the
following cases obliged carefully to shun it; or in speaking about
our neighbour we must observe these cautions.

1. We should never in severe terms inveigh against any man without
reasonable warrant, or presuming upon a good call and commission
thereto. As every man should not assume to himself the power of
administering justice (of trying, sentencing, and punishing
offenders), so must not every man take upon him to speak against
those who seem to do ill; which is a sort of punishment, including
the infliction of smart and damage upon the persons concerned.
Every man hath indeed a commission, in due place and season, with
discretion and moderation to admonish his neighbour offending; but
ot