wever not God's first intention for
them nor His last. Those chapters of St. Paul[15] which contain the
most terrible things about the present reprobation of the Jews contain
also the most emphatic repudiation of the idea that moral reprobation
was God's first idea for them, or His last. 'The gifts and calling of
God,' that is, His good gifts and calling, says St. Paul, speaking of
the now 'reprobate' Jews, are 'without repentance[16].' God's present
reprobation of them is only a process towards a fresh opportunity.
'God hath shut up all into disobedience that he might have mercy upon
all[17].' Men may baffle the original divine purpose, and that, so far
as their own blessedness is concerned, even finally: they may become
finally 'reprobate': but the divine purpose for them at its root
remains a purpose for good. 'God will have all men to be saved and to
come to the knowledge of the truth[18].'
{66}
And once again, the idea of a predestination for good, taking effect
necessarily and irrespective of men's co-operation, is an idea which
has been intruded unjustifiably into St. Paul's thought. It exalts his
whole being to consider that he is co-operating with God, and that the
conditions under which he lives represent a divine purpose with which
he is called to work. It is this which makes him feel it is worth
while working: it is this which nerves and sustains him in all
sufferings, and enlarges his horizon in all restraints: but he never
suggests that it does not lie within the mysterious power of his own
will to withdraw himself from co-operation with God. It is at least
conceivable to him that he should himself be rejected[19]. In that
famous list of external forces which he feels are unable to tear him
from the grasp of the divine love, his own will is not included[20],
nor could be included without gross inconsistency.
Beyond all question there is here one problem which remains for all
time unsolved and insoluble--the relation of divine fore-knowledge[21]
{67} to human freedom. If we men are free to choose, how can it be, or
can it really be the case at all, that God knows beforehand actually
how each individual will behave in each particular case? This is a
problem which we cannot fathom any more than we can fathom any of the
problems which require for their solution an experience of what an
absolute and eternal consciousness can mean. But the problem belongs
to metaphysics. It inheres in the idea
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