essed themselves, but granted only the power to such
classes of raising a contribution from the remaining portion of the
community, by levying a higher price for their commodity than it would
otherwise command. As with individuals, it was equally necessary to make
scarcity to secure price, and that could only be done by restricting the
sources of supply by prohibiting, or by imposing high duties on, foreign
importations. Many circumstances, however, combined to render the use of
this power by Parliament less obvious than it had been when exercised by
the sovereign, but chiefly the fact that protection was usually granted
by imposing high duties, often in their effect quite prohibitory, under
the plea of providing revenue for the state. Many other more modern
excuses have been urged, such as those of encouraging native industry,
and countervailing peculiar burthens, in order to reconcile public
opinion to the exactions arising out of the system, all of which we
shall, on future occasions, carefully consider separately. But, above
all, the great reason why these evils have been so long endured has
been, that the public have believed that all classes and interests,
though perhaps not exactly to the same extent, have shared in
protection. We propose at present to confine our consideration to the
effects of protection,--first, on the community generally; and secondly,
on the individual classes protected.

As it is admitted that protection ought, if granted at all, to be given
to all alike, it would follow that the whole produce of the country
would be raised to an artificial price; and if this were the case, as
far as regarded the exchange or transactions among members of the same
community, the effect would be merely nominal, of no advantage to any
one, and of little disadvantage beyond the enormous public expense
needed to prevent people cheating each other by smuggling and bringing
in the cheaper foreign article;--but such a community must forego all
notion or idea of a foreign trade;--they must have no desires to be
gratified beyond themselves, and they must have within themselves the
independent means of supplying every want. For even if the law be strong
enough to maintain an artificial high price at home, it has no power of
making other countries pay that price; and if everything we possessed
commanded a higher price at home than other countries could supply the
same for, we should have nothing which we could exchange