no British statesman ever
lived, so I hope none ever will live, unwise enough to bind his
country by so preposterous an obligation, as that she should go to
war, not merely in defence of an ally, but at the will and beck of
that ally, whenever ambition, or false policy, or a predominant
faction, may plunge that ally into wars of her own seeking and
contriving.
On the other hand, would it have been advisable for us to precipitate
Portugal into the war? Undoubtedly we might have done so. For by
declaring war against France, on behalf of Spain, we should have
invited France (and there was perhaps a party in Portugal ready enough
to second the invitation) to extend her hostilities to the whole of
the Peninsula. But was it an object of sound policy to bring a war
upon our hands, of which it was clear that we must bear all the
burden? And was not the situation of Portugal, then, so far from being
a reason for war, that it added the third motive, and one of the
greatest weight, to our preference for a pacific policy?
Fourthly.--As to our Continental allies. There was surely nothing in
their situation to induce Great Britain to take a part in the war.
Their Ministers have indeed been withdrawn from Madrid; but no alarm
has been excited, by that act, in Spain. No case has occurred which
gives to France a right to call for the assistance of the allies. But
had the British Government taken a decided part in support of the
Spaniards, a material change might have been produced in the aspect
of affairs. Spain, who has now to contend with France alone, might in
that case have had to contend with other and more overwhelming forces.
Without pushing these considerations farther, enough surely has been
said to indicate the expediency of adhering to that line of policy
which we successfully pursued at Verona; and of endeavouring, by our
example as well as by our influence, to prevent the complication and
circumscribe the range of hostilities. Let it be considered how much
the duration and the disasters of a war may depend upon the multitude
or the fewness of its elements; and how much the accession of any
new party, or parties, to a war must add to the difficulties of
pacification.
I come next to consider the situation of this country. And first, as
to our ability for the undertaking of a war. I have already said, that
the country is yet rich enough in resources, in means, in strength,
to engage in any contest to which national hono
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