hes me with concealed strokes of satire, moves not my indignation to
such a degree, as if he flatly told me I was a fool and coxcomb; though
I equally understand his meaning, as if he did. This difference is to be
attributed to the influence of general rules.

Whether a person openly, abuses me, or slyly intimates his contempt, in
neither case do I immediately perceive his sentiment or opinion; and it
is only by signs, that is, by its effects, I become sensible of it. The
only difference, then, betwixt these two cases consists in this, that
in the open discovery of his sentiments he makes use of signs, which are
general and universal; and in the secret intimation employs such as are
more singular and uncommon. The effect of this circumstance is, that the
imagination, in running from the present impression to the absent idea,
makes the transition with greater facility, and consequently conceives
the object with greater force, where the connexion is common and
universal, than where it is more rare and particular. Accordingly we
may observe, that the open declaration of our sentiments is called the
taking off the mask, as the secret intimation of our opinions is said
to be the veiling of them. The difference betwixt an idea produced by
a general connexion, and that arising from a particular one is here
compared to the difference betwixt an impression and an idea. This
difference in the imagination has a suitable effect on the passions; and
this effect is augmented by another circumstance. A secret intimation
of anger or contempt shews that we still have some consideration for
the person, and avoid the directly abusing him. This makes a concealed
satire less disagreeable; but still this depends on the same principle.
For if an idea were not more feeble, when only intimated, it would never
be esteemed a mark of greater respect to proceed in this method than in
the other.

Sometimes scurrility is less displeasing than delicate satire, because
it revenges us in a manner for the injury at the very time it is
committed, by affording us a just reason to blame and contemn the
person, who injures us. But this phaenomenon likewise depends upon the
same principle. For why do we blame all gross and injurious language,
unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and
humanity? And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any
delicate satire? The rules of good breeding condemn whatever is openly
disobliging,