particular, having
established it as a principle, that we are perfectly acquainted with the
essence of matter, have very naturally inferred, that it is endowed with
no efficacy, and that it is impossible for it of itself to communicate
motion, or produce any of those effects, which we ascribe to it. As the
essence of matter consists in extension, and as extension implies not
actual motion, but only mobility; they conclude, that the energy, which
produces the motion, cannot lie in the extension.

This conclusion leads them into another, which they regard as perfectly
unavoidable. Matter, say they, is in itself entirely unactive, and
deprived of any power, by which it may produce, or continue, or
communicate motion: But since these effects are evident to our senses,
and since the power, that produces them, must be placed somewhere, it
must lie in the DEITY, or that divine being, who contains in his nature
all excellency and perfection. It is the deity, therefore, who is the
prime mover of the universe, and who not only first created matter, and
gave it it's original impulse, but likewise by a continued exertion of
omnipotence, supports its existence, and successively bestows on it
all those motions, and configurations, and qualities, with which it is
endowed.

This opinion is certainly very curious, and well worth our attention;
but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this place, if we
reflect a moment on our present purpose in taking notice of it. We
have established it as a principle, that as all ideas are derived from
impressions, or some precedent perceptions, it is impossible we can have
any idea of power and efficacy, unless some instances can be produced,
wherein this power is perceived to exert itself. Now, as these instances
can never be discovered in body, the Cartesians, proceeding upon their
principle of innate ideas, have had recourse to a supreme spirit or
deity, whom they consider as the only active being in the universe, and
as the immediate cause of every alteration in matter. But the principle
of innate ideas being allowed to be false, it follows, that the
supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that
idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which
are presented to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in
our own minds. For if every idea be derived from an impression, the idea
of a deity proceeds from the same origin; and if no impre