draw an inference from one
to another. This multiplicity of resembling instances, therefore,
constitutes the very essence of power or connexion, and is the source
from which the idea of it arises. In order, then, to understand the idea
of power, we must consider that multiplicity; nor do I ask more to give
a solution of that difficulty, which has so long perplexed us. For thus
I reason. The repetition of perfectly similar instances can never alone
give rise to an original idea, different from what is to be found in any
particular instance, as has been observed, and as evidently follows from
our fundamental principle, that all ideas are copyed from impressions.
Since therefore the idea of power is a new original idea, not to be
found in any one instance, and which yet arises from the repetition of
several instances, it follows, that the repetition alone has not that
effect, but must either discover or produce something new, which is the
source of that idea. Did the repetition neither discover nor produce
anything new, our ideas might be multiplyed by it, but would not
be enlarged above what they are upon the observation of one single
instance. Every enlargement, therefore, (such as the idea of power or
connexion) which arises from the multiplicity of similar instances,
is copyed from some effects of the multiplicity, and will be perfectly
understood by understanding these effects. Wherever we find anything new
to be discovered or produced by the repetition, there we must place the
power, and must never look for it in any other object.

But it is evident, in the first place, that the repetition of like
objects in like relations of succession and contiguity discovers nothing
new in any one of them: since we can draw no inference from it, nor make
it a subject either of our demonstrative or probable reasonings;[Sect.
6.] as has been already proved. Nay suppose we coued draw an inference,
it would be of no consequence in the present case; since no kind of
reasoning can give rise to a new idea, such as this of power is; but
wherever we reason, we must antecedently be possest of clear ideas,
which may be the objects of our reasoning. The conception always
precedes the understanding; and where the one is obscure, the other is
uncertain; where the one fails, the other must fail also.

Secondly, It is certain that this repetition of similar objects in
similar situations produces nothing new either in these objects, or
in any ext