causes among the chances, and a
conjunction of necessity in some particulars, with a total indifference
in others. Where nothing limits the chances, every notion, that the most
extravagant fancy can form, is upon a footing of equality; nor can there
be any circumstance to give one the advantage above another. Thus unless
we allow, that there are some causes to make the dice fall, and preserve
their form in their fall, and lie upon some one of their sides, we can
form no calculation concerning the laws of hazard. But supposing these
causes to operate, and supposing likewise all the rest to be indifferent
and to be determined by chance, it is easy to arrive at a notion of a
superior combination of chances. A dye that has four sides marked with
a certain number of spots, and only two with another, affords us an
obvious and easy instance of this superiority. The mind is here limited
by the causes to such a precise number and quality of the events; and at
the same time is undetermined in its choice of any particular event.

Proceeding then in that reasoning, wherein we have advanced three steps;
that chance is merely the negation of a cause, and produces a total
indifference in the mind; that one negation of a cause and one total
indifference can never be superior or inferior to another; and that
there must always be a mixture of causes among the chances, in order to
be the foundation of any reasoning: We are next to consider what effect
a superior combination of chances can have upon the mind, and after what
manner it influences our judgment and opinion. Here we may repeat all
the same arguments we employed in examining that belief, which arises
from causes; and may prove, after the same manner, that a superior
number of chances produces our assent neither by demonstration nor
probability. It is indeed evident that we can never by the comparison
of mere ideas make any discovery, which can be of consequence in this
affairs and that it is impossible to prove with certainty, that any
event must fall on that side where there is a superior number of
chances. To, suppose in this case any certainty, were to overthrow what
we have established concerning the opposition of chances, and their
perfect equality and indifference.

Should it be said, that though in an opposition of chances it is
impossible to determine with certainty, on which side the event will
fall, yet we can pronounce with certainty, that it is more likely and
prob