possession, no more than the piercing the gates with a
spear; but only forms a relation; and there is a relation,
in the other case, equally obvious, tho' not, perhaps, of
equal force. Which of these relations, then, conveys a right
and property, or whether any of them be sufficient for that
effect, I leave to the decision of such as are wiser than
myself.]

But such disputes may not only arise concerning the real existence of
property and possession, but also concerning their extent; and these
disputes are often susceptible of no decision, or can be decided by no
other faculty than the imagination. A person who lands on the shore of
a small island, that is desart and uncultivated, is deemed its possessor
from the very first moment, and acquires the property of the whole;
because the object is there bounded and circumscribed in the fancy, and
at the same time is proportioned to the new possessor. The same person
landing on a desart island, as large as Great Britain, extends his
property no farther than his immediate possession; though a numerous
colony are esteemed the proprietors of the whole from the instant of
their debarkment.

But it often happens, that the title of first possession becomes obscure
through time; and that it is impossible to determine many controversies,
which may arise concerning it. In that case long possession or
prescription naturally takes place, and gives a person a sufficient
property in any thing he enjoys. The nature of human society admits not
of any great accuracy; nor can we always remount to the first origin of
things, in order to determine their present condition. Any considerable
space of time sets objects at such a distance, that they seem, in a
manner, to lose their reality, and have as little influence on the mind,
as if they never had been in being. A man's title, that is clear and
certain at present, will seem obscure and doubtful fifty years hence,
even though the facts, on which it is founded, should be proved with
the greatest evidence and certainty. The same facts have not the same
influence after so long an interval of time. And this may be received as
a convincing argument for our preceding doctrine with regard to property
and justice. Possession during a long tract of time conveys a title to
any object. But as it is certain, that, however every thing be produced
in time, there is nothing real that is produced by time; it follows,
that p