society. Government, therefore, arises from the
same voluntary conversation of men; and it is evident, that the same
convention, which establishes government, will also determine the
persons who are to govern, and will remove all doubt and ambiguity in
this particular. And the voluntary consent of men must here have the
greater efficacy, that the authority of the magistrate does at first
stand upon the foundation of a promise of the subjects, by which they
bind themselves to obedience; as in every other contract or engagement.
The same promise, then, which binds them to obedience, ties them down to
a particular person, and makes him the object of their allegiance.

But when government has been established on this footing for some
considerable time, and the separate interest, which we have in
submission, has produced a separate sentiment of morality, the case
is entirely altered, and a promise is no longer able to determine the
particular magistrate since it is no longer considered as the foundation
of government. We naturally suppose ourselves born to submission; and
imagine, that such particular persons have a right to command, as we on
our part are bound to obey. These notions of right and obligation are
derived from nothing but the advantage we reap from government, which
gives us a repugnance to practise resistance ourselves, and makes us
displeased with any instance of it in others. But here it is remarkable,
that in this new state of affairs, the original sanction of government,
which is interest, is not admitted to determine the persons, whom we are
to obey, as the original sanction did at first, when affairs were on
the footing of a promise. A promise fixes and determines the persons,
without any uncertainty: But it is evident, that if men were to regulate
their conduct in this particular, by the view of a peculiar interest,
either public or private, they would involve themselves in endless
confusion, and would render all government, in a great measure,
ineffectual. The private interest of every one is different; and though
the public interest in itself be always one and the same, yet it becomes
the source of as great dissentions, by reason of the different opinions
of particular persons concerning it. The same interest, therefore,
which causes us to submit to magistracy, makes us renounce itself in
the choice of our magistrates, and binds us down to a certain form of
government, and to particular persons, withou