delivery of the corn contained in it: The giving of stone
and earth represents the delivery of a mannor. This is a kind of
superstitious practice in civil laws, and in the laws of nature,
resembling the Roman catholic superstitions in religion. As the Roman
catholics represent the inconceivable mysteries of the Christian
religion, and render them more present to the mind, by a taper, or
habit, or grimace, which is supposed to resemble them; so lawyers and
moralists have run into like inventions for the same reason, and
have endeavoured by those means to satisfy themselves concerning the
transference of property by consent.

SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES

That the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises, is
not natural, will sufficiently appear from these two propositions,
which I proceed to prove, viz, that a promise would not be intelligible,
before human conventions had established it; and that even if it were
intelligible, it would not be attended with any moral obligation.

I say, first, that a promise is not intelligible naturally, nor
antecedent to human conventions; and that a man, unacquainted with
society, could never enter into any engagements with another, even
though they could perceive each other's thoughts by intuition. If
promises be natural and intelligible, there must be some act of the mind
attending these words, I promise; and on this act of the mind must the
obligation depend. Let us, therefore, run over all the faculties of the
soul, and see which of them is exerted in our promises.

The act of the mind, exprest by a promise, is not a resolution to
perform any thing: For that alone never imposes any obligation. Nor is
it a desire of such a performance: For we may bind ourselves without
such a desire, or even with an aversion, declared and avowed. Neither
is it the willing of that action, which we promise to perform: For a
promise always regards some future time, and the will has an influence
only on present actions. It follows, therefore, that since the act of
the mind, which enters into a promise, and produces its obligation, is
neither the resolving, desiring, nor willing any particular performance,
it must necessarily be the willing of that obligation, which arises
from the promise. Nor is this only a conclusion of philosophy; but is
entirely conformable to our common ways of thinking and of expressing
ourselves, when we say that we are bound by our own cons