nsmen.

Hence it was, no doubt, that after the surrender of Yorktown,
hostilities were practically at an end with America, while the naval
warfare with France and Spain was carried on for another twelvemonth,
and that the signing of provisional articles of peace with the United
States preceded by two months that of similar articles with France and
Spain, the armistice with Holland being of still later date. It may even
be conjectured that the outbreak of war with France and Spain, instead
of incensing the mind of the English people against the Americans,
rather gave different objects to their angry passions, and tended to
diminish their bitterness toward the colonists. It must have been a kind
of relief to Englishmen to find themselves fighting once more against
those whom they considered hereditary enemies, against men who did not
speak their own mother-tongue; and the wholly unprovoked character of
these foreign hostilities would soften men's feelings toward the
stubbornness of those colonists of their own blood, who after all asked
only to be left alone. It is moreover observable that when peace came,
though it upset the Shelburne ministry, yet that of the coalition which
succeeded it was most unpopular, and addresses came pouring in from
counties and towns to thank the King for making the peace.

Substantially indeed--although colonial independence would no doubt have
been achieved sooner or later--the more we look into the events of the
war of 1775-1783, the more, perhaps, shall we be convinced that it
resolves itself into a duel between two men who never saw each other in
the flesh, Washington and George III.

Take Washington out of the history on the American side, and it is
impossible to conceive of American success. It is barely possible that
under Greene--the one general after Washington's own heart, who wrote to
him from his command in the South, "We fight, get beaten, and fight
again"--the army itself might have been commanded with an ability which
would enable it to withstand its British opponents. But neither Greene
nor any other general possessed that weight of personal character which
fixed the trust of Congress and people on Washington, maintained him in
authority through all reverses, and enabled him to criticise with such
unflinching frankness the measures of Congress.

Take, on the other hand, George III out of the history on the British
side, and it is beyond question that if the war had ever bro