against Austria." In this same letter Napoleon III. reminds the
Pontiff, that at the conclusion of the war he had recommended, as the best
means of maintaining tranquillity, the secularization of his government,
and he still believes that, "if, at that time, his Holiness had consented
to an administrative separation of the Romagna, and the nomination of a
lay governor, the provinces would have come, once more, under his
authority." What, then, could the people have meant when they petitioned,
on occasion of the Pope's progress, to have a cardinal for governor, as
formerly, and not lay prefects, as was then the case, under the regime
inaugurated by Pius IX.? The Pope having neglected his advice, Napoleon,
of course, was powerless to stay the tide of revolution. "My efforts were
only successful in preventing the insurrection from spreading, and the
resignation of Garibaldi preserved the marches of Ancona from certain
invasion." No doubt it did. But, as will soon be seen, this modern
crusader was let loose in order that he might follow his calling more
vigorously, _i.e._, rob and slay on a more extensive scale. The Emperor
now approaches the subjects of the Congress. In his letter he recognizes
the indisputable right of the Holy See to the legations. But he does not
think it probable that the Powers would think it proper to have recourse
to force, in order to restore them. If the restoration were effected by
means of foreign troops, it would be necessary, for a long time, to hold
military occupation of these provinces; and this would only feed the
enmities and hatred of the Italian people. This state of uncertainty
cannot always last. What then is to be done? The Imperial revolutionist
concludes, expressing the most sincere regret, and the pain which such a
solution gives him, that the way most in harmony with the interests of the
Holy See is that it should sacrifice the revolted provinces. For the last
fifty years they have only caused embarrassment to the government of the
Holy Father. If he asked of the Powers to guarantee to him, in exchange
for them, the possession of what remained, order, he had no doubt, would
be immediately restored. This letter left no room to doubt that the policy
of the pamphlet, "_The Pope and the Congress_," was that of Napoleon III.
As soon as this was known the Congress became impossible. The Pope could
not agree to deliberations based upon the principle of his dispossession.
Austria could not