l and resolution of the
English general. The famous lines, on which the French had been
labouring for months, had been broken through and carried, during a
nocturnal conflict of a few hours; they had lost all their redoubts
and ten pieces of cannon, with which they were armed; M. D'Allegre,
with twelve hundred prisoners, had been taken; and the army which
lately besieged Liege and threatened Maestricht, was now driven back,
defeated and discouraged, to seek refuge under the cannon of Louvain.

Overkirk, who had so ably co-operated with Marlborough in this
glorious victory, had the magnanimity as well as candour, in his
despatch to the States-general, to ascribe the success which had been
gained entirely to the skill and courage of the English general.[5]
But the Dutch generals, who had interrupted his career of success, had
the malignity to charge the consequences of their misconduct on his
head, and even carried their effrontery so far as to accuse him of
supineness in not following up his success, and cutting off the
enemy's retreat to the Dyle, when it was themselves who had refused to
obey his orders to do so. Rains of extraordinary severity fell from
the 19th to the 23d July, which rendered all offensive operations
impracticable, and gave Villeroi time, of which he ably availed
himself, to strengthen his position behind the Dyle to such a degree,
as to render it no longer assailable with any prospect of success. The
precious moment, when the enemy might have been driven from it in the
first tumult of success, had been lost.

The subsequent success in the Flemish campaign by no means
corresponded to its brilliant commencement. The jealousy of the Dutch
ruined every thing. This gave rise to recriminations and jealousies,
which rendered it impracticable even for the great abilities and
consummate address of Marlborough to effect any thing of importance
with the heterogeneous array, with the nominal command of which he was
invested. The English general dispatched his adjutant-general, Baron
Hompesch, to represent to the States-general the impossibility of
going on longer with such a divided responsibility; but, though they
listened to his representations, nothing could induce them to put
their troops under the direct orders of the commander-in-chief. They
still had "field deputies," as they were called who were invested with
the entire direction of the Dutch troops; and as they were civilians,
wholly unacquainted wit