except the
capture of Leau and levelling of the enemy's lines on the Gheet.
Marlborough wrote a formal letter to the States, in which he regretted
the opportunity which had been lost, which M. Overkirk had coincided
with him in thinking promised a great and glorious victory; and he
added, "my heart is so full that I cannot forbear representing to your
High Mightinesses on this occasion, that I find my authority here to
be much less than when I had the honour to command your troops in
Germany."[8] The Dutch generals sent in their counter-memorial to
their government, which contains a curious picture of their idea of
the subordination and direction of an army, and furnishes a key to the
jealousy which had proved so fatal to the common cause. They
complained that the Duke of Marlborough, "without holding a council of
war, made two or three marches _for the execution of some design
formed by his Grace_; and we cannot conceal from your High
Mightinesses that all the generals of our army think it very strange
_that they should not have the least notice of the said marches_."[9]
It has been already mentioned that Marlborough, like every other good
general, kept his designs to himself, from the impossibility of
otherwise keeping them from the enemy; and that he had the additional
motive, in the case of the Dutch deputies and generals, of being
desirous "to cheat them into victory."

Chagrined by disappointment, and fully convinced, as Wellington was
after his campaign with Cuesta and the Spaniards at Talavera, that it
was in vain to attempt any thing further with such impediments, on the
part of the Allies, thrown in his way, Marlborough retired, in the
beginning of September, to Tirlemont, the mineral waters of which had
been recommended to him; and, in the end of October, the troops on
both sides went into winter quarters. His vexation with the Dutch at
this period strongly appeared in his private letters to his intimate
friends;[10] but, though he exerted himself to the utmost during the
suspension of operations in the field, both by memorials to his own
government, and representations to the Dutch rulers, to get the
direction of the army put upon a better footing, yet he had
magnanimity and patriotism enough to sacrifice his private feelings to
the public good. Instead of striving, therefore, to inflame the
resentment of the English cabinet at the conduct of the Dutch
generals, he strove only to moderate it; and prevailed