w occupied the
ground, afterwards covered by Napoleon's army: the forest of Soignies
and approaches to Brussels were guarded by the French. Incalculable
were the results of a victory gained in such a position: it was by
success gained over an army of half the size, that Napoleon
established his power in so surprising a manner at Marengo. Impressed
with such ideas, Marlborough, on the 18th August, anxiously
reconnoitred the ground; and finding the front practicable for the
passage of troops, moved up his men in three columns to the attack.
The artillery was sent to Wavre; the Allied columns traversed at right
angles the line of march by which Blucher advanced to the support of
Wellington on the 18th June 1815.

Had Marlborough's orders been executed, it is probable he would have
gained a victory, which, from the relative position of the two armies,
could not have been but decisive; and possibly the 18th August 1705,
might have become as celebrated in history as the 18th June 1815.
Overkirk, to whom he showed the ground at Over-Ische which he had
destined for an attack, perfectly concurred in the expedience of it,
and orders were given to bring the artillery forward to commence a
cannonade. By the malice or negligence of Slangenberg, who had again
violated his express instructions, and permitted the baggage to
intermingle with the artillery-train, the guns had not arrived, and
some hours were lost before they could be pushed up. At length, at
noon, the guns were brought forward, and the troops being in line,
Marlborough rode along the front to give his last orders. The English
and Germans were in the highest spirits, anticipating certain victory
from the relative position of the armies; the French fighting with
their faces to Paris, the Allies with theirs to Brussels. But again
the Dutch deputies and generals interposed, alleging that the enemy
was too strongly posted to be attacked with any prospect of success.
"Gentlemen," said Marlborough to the circle of generals which
surrounded him, "I have reconnoitred the ground, and made dispositions
for an attack. I am convinced that conscientiously, and as men of
honour, we cannot now retire without an action. Should we neglect this
opportunity, we must be responsible before God and man. You see the
confusion which pervades the ranks of the enemy, and their
embarrassment at our manoeuvres. I leave you to judge whether we
should attack to-day, or wait till to-morrow. It is inde