ons with Marghiloman and his representatives on these
questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions
especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of
prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the
drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the
Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences
were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of
the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one
hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a
compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in
particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the
original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead
to any result.

The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for
five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part
at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly
opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an
arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have
all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a
certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but
not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign
Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a
Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an
impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we
were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather
use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania
through the medium of such politicians in that country as were
disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central
Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in
Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be
rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might
gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing
everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the
German Secretary of State, Kuehlmann, of the inadvisability of the
demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by
the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement of
Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it
impossible for him