German territory to the Entente
so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a
step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in
this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our
military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the
German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is
undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to
such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I
should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity
solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most
valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at
favourable relations with Germany.

Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the
German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the
serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917--eighteen months
ago--I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he
forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely
of my opinion.

[This report is already printed in these pages. See p. 146.]

This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again
expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine
campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to
take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be
calculated to give an impression of weakness.

As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not
to be thought of.

As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine
ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the
Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with
Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to
Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in
order to secure peace. But we were met with a _non possumus_ and the
German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the
question.

The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that
if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine;
and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have
restrained me had it been a question of the highest value--of peace
itself.

When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views
steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey o