question of fact," says he, "_which is not in the province of moral
philosophy to decide_. It very likely may be so. So far as I know, the
facts are not sufficiently known to warrant a full opinion on the
subject. We will, therefore, suppose it to be the case, and ask, What is
the duty of masters _under these circumstances_?" In the discussion of
this question, the author comes to the conclusion that a master may hold
his slaves in bondage, provided his intentions be good, and with a view
to set them at liberty as soon as they shall be qualified for such a
state.

Moral philosophy, then, it seems, when it closes its eyes upon facts,
pronounces that slavery should be _immediately_ abolished; but if it
consider facts, which, instead of being denied, are admitted to be "very
likely" true, it decides against its immediate abolition! Or, rather,
moral philosophy looks at the fact that slavery is an _injury_, in order
to see that it should be forthwith abolished; but closes its eyes upon
the fact that its abolition may be a still greater injury, lest this
foregone conclusion should be called in question! Has moral philosophy,
then, an eye only for the facts which lie one side of the question it
proposes to decide?

Slavery is an _injury_, says Dr. Wayland, and therefore it should be
_immediately_ abolished. But its abolition would be a still greater
injury, replies the objector. This may be true, says Dr. Wayland: it is
highly probable; but then this question of injury is one of fact, which
it is not in the province of moral philosophy to decide! So much for the
consistency and even-handed justice of the author.

The position assumed by him, that questions of fact are not within the
province of moral philosophy, is one of so great importance that it
deserves a separate and distinct notice. Though seldom openly avowed,
yet is it so often tacitly assumed in the arguments and declamations of
abolitionists, that it shall be more fully considered in the following
section.

Sec. V. _The fifth fallacy of the abolitionist._

"Suppose that A has a right to use the body of B according to his--that
is, A's--will. Now if this be true, it is true universally; and hence, A
has the control over the body of B, and B has control over the body of
C, C of D, &c., and Z again over the body of A: that is, every separate
will has the right of control over some other body besides its own, and
has no right of control over its own body or inte