llect."[144] Now, if
men were cut out of pasteboard, all exactly alike, and distinguished
from each other only by the letters of the alphabet, then the reasoning
of the author would be excellent. But it happens that men are not cut
out of pasteboard. They are distinguished by differences of character,
by diverse habits and propensities, which render the reasonings of the
political philosopher rather more difficult than if he had merely to
deal with or arrange the letters of the alphabet. In one, for example,
the intellectual and moral part is almost wholly eclipsed by the brute;
while, in another, reason and religion have gained the ascendency, so as
to maintain a steady empire over the whole man. The first, as the author
himself admits, is incompetent to self-government, and should,
therefore, be held by the law of society in a state of servitude. But
does it follow that "if this be true, it is true _universally_?" Because
one man who can not govern himself may be governed by another, does it
follow that every man should be governed by others? Does it follow that
the one who has acquired and maintained the most perfect
self-government, should be subjected to the control of him who is wholly
incompetent to control himself? Yes, certainly, if the reasoning of Dr.
Wayland be true; but, according to every sound principle of political
ethics, the answer is, emphatically, No!

There is a difference between a Hottentot and a Newton. The first should
no more be condemned to astronomical calculations and discoveries, than
the last should be required to follow a plough. Such differences,
however, are overlooked by much of the reasoning of the abolitionist. In
regard to the question of fact, whether a man is really a man and not a
mere thing, he is profoundly versed. He can discourse most eloquently
upon this subject: he can prove, by most irrefragable arguments, that a
Hottentot is a man as well as a Newton. But as to the differences among
men, such nice distinctions are beneath his philosophy! It is true that
one may be sunk so low in the scale of being that civil freedom would be
a curse to him; yet, whether this be so or not, is a question of fact
which his philosophy does not stoop to decide. He merely wishes to know
what rights A can possibly have, either by the law of God or man, which
do not equally belong to B? And if A would feel it an injury to be
placed under the control of B, then, "there is no doubt" that it is
equa