dignity; although at one period there was a
certain amount of public complaint that Congress was usurping more
power than belongs to it, and recently that power was being usurped by
the president, there has hardly been (except from Mr. Gompers and Mr.
Hearst) any complaint that power is usurped by the _judicial_ branch,
however unpopular its decisions. But in England there is no pretence
of maintaining the three branches uniform either in importance or in
power. Starting with the Great Council, which had originally only a
certain amount of executive power and a great deal of judicial power,
they have retained and added to the former, while practically giving
up the latter; and, moreover, they have divided into the two houses,
the House of Lords and the House of Commons, with a division of
sovereignty between them, the Commons, of course, getting the lion's
share. The only judicial power substantially now remaining in the
English Parliament is the power of impeachment, which is rarely
exercised in England, and the appellate jurisdiction of the House
of Lords, of the "law" lords, that is, those peers who held legal
offices. On the other hand the legislative function of Parliament,
which began merely in the way of saying what the law was, has
enormously developed, and still more so the executive. Thus the
legislative branch of the three divisions in the English government
has increased out of all proportion to both the others, having now all
the legislative power and most of the executive. And legislatively it
is omnipotent; it is confined by no constitution; even the king cannot
withhold his consent. Parliament can make any law, although against
what _was_ the Constitution; the Constitution may be modified by a
simple statute. So their legislative function is infinite; and their
executive function has, in substance, grown very large, because the
British government is carried on by the cabinet, which is practically
a committee of the House of Commons. But of the judicial function,
which was the principal function of the Great Council at the time
of the Conquest, hardly a shred remains. It is the history of all
countries that people are not jealous of the judicial power, while
they are extremely anxious to seize the legislative and executive.
With us, however, we are supposed to have all three functions
co-ordinate and in good working activity. But in both countries, money
bills, bills imposing taxes, are the function of the