the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret
engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House
that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation
of honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the
ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and
what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The
Triple Entente was not an alliance--it was a diplomatic group. The House
will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis--also a Balkan
crisis--originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to
London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I
told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I
did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in
promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never
asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise
of anything more than diplomatic support--up till yesterday no promise
of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of
obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan
crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it
came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty's Government when
a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over
the country, and I--spending three days a week in my constituency and
three days at the Foreign Office--was asked the question whether, if
that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give
armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign
power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of
public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war
was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco--a question which
had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France,
an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides--that if out of that
agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public
opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of
France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as
far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French