how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into
his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the
obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not
wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to
what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and
collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have
given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and
western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet
being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different
from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up
between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there
was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the
Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of
the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the
two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a
war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the
aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the
undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this
going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded,
looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the
feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these
circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would
spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the
point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to
base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we
say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the
Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to
what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely
undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do
as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If
we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the
Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can
anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us
assume