this manner, that, of all things, we ought to be the most concerned
who, and what sort of men they are that hold the trust of everything
that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to
the nation, but what must either render us totally desperate, or soothe
us into the security of idiots. We must soften into a credulity below
the milkiness of infancy to think all men virtuous. We must be tainted
with a malignity truly diabolical to believe all the world to be equally
wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in private, some good,
some evil. The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other,
are the first objects of all true policy. But that form of government,
which, neither in its direct institutions, nor in their immediate
tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy
hands, but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of
agreeably to the uncontrolled pleasure of any one man, however excellent
or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but
consequentially erroneous in every part of it.

In arbitrary governments, the constitution of the ministry follows the
constitution of the legislature. Both the law and the magistrate are the
creatures of will. It must be so. Nothing, indeed, will appear more
certain, on any tolerable consideration of this matter, than that _every
sort of government ought to have its administration correspondent to its
legislature_. If it should be otherwise, things must fall into an
hideous disorder. The people of a free commonwealth, who have taken such
care that their laws should be the result of general consent, cannot be
so senseless as to suffer their executory system to be composed of
persons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the
public love and confidence have recommended to those powers, upon the
use of which the very being of the state depends.

The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition of rewards
and honors, is one of the first advantages of a free state. Without it,
or something equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the
substance of freedom; certainly none of the vivifying energy of good
government. The frame of our commonwealth did not admit of such an
actual election: but it provided as well, and (while the spirit of the
constitution is preserved) better for all the effects of it than by the
method of suffrage in any democratic state wh