hat they should in all cases be wholly untouched by
the opinions and feelings of the people out of doors. By this want of
sympathy they would cease to be a House of Commons. For it is not the
derivation of the power of that House from the people, which makes it in
a distinct sense their representative. The king is the representative of
the people; so are the lords; so are the judges. They all are trustees
for the people, as well as the commons; because no power is given for
the sole sake of the holder; and although government certainly is an
institution of divine authority, yet its forms, and the persons who
administer it, all originate from the people.

A popular origin cannot therefore be the characteristical distinction of
a popular representative. This belongs equally to all parts of
government and in all forms. The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House
of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of
the nation. It was not instituted to be a control _upon_ the people, as
of late it has been taught, by a doctrine of the most pernicious
tendency. It was designed as a control _for_ the people. Other
institutions have been formed for the purpose of checking popular
excesses; and they are, I apprehend, fully adequate to their object. If
not, they ought to be made so. The House of Commons, as it was never
intended for the support of peace and subordination, is miserably
appointed for that service; having no stronger weapon than its mace,
and no better officer than its serjeant-at-arms, which it can command of
its own proper authority. A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and
judicial magistracy; an anxious care of public money; an openness,
approaching towards facility, to public complaint: these seem to be the
true characteristics of a House of Commons. But an addressing House of
Commons, and a petitioning nation; a House of Commons full of
confidence, when the nation is plunged in despair; in the utmost harmony
with ministers, whom the people regard with the utmost abhorrence; who
vote thanks, when the public opinion calls upon them for impeachments;
who are eager to grant, when the general voice demands account; who, in
all disputes between the people and administration, presume against the
people; who punish their disorders, but refuse even to inquire into the
provocations to them; this is an unnatural, a monstrous state of things
in this constitution. Such an assembly may be a great, wise,