erent conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burst. The
discretionary power of the crown in the formation of ministry, abused by
bad or weak men, has given rise to a system, which, without directly
violating the letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the
whole constitution.

A plan of favoritism for our executory government is essentially at
variance with the plan of our legislature. One great end undoubtedly of
a mixed government like ours, composed of monarchy, and of controls, on
the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the prince shall
not be able to violate the laws. This is useful indeed and fundamental.
But this, even at first view, is no more than a negative advantage; an
armor merely defensive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in
importance, _that the discretionary powers which are necessarily vested
in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the
nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of
peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon
public principles and national grounds, and, not on the likings or
prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court_. This, I said, is
equal in importance to the securing a government according to law. The
laws reach but a very little way. Constitute government how you please,
infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the
powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of
ministers of state. Even all the use and potency of the laws depends
upon them. Without them, your commonwealth is no better than a scheme
upon paper; and not a living, active, effective constitution. It is
possible that through negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully
conducted, ministers may suffer one part of government to languish,
another to be perverted from its purposes, and every valuable interest
of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without possibility of
fixing any single act on which a criminal prosecution can be justly
grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active part of the state,
far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise government, ought to be
among its very first and dearest objects. When, therefore, the abettors
of the new system tell us, that between them and their opposers there is
nothing but a struggle for power, and that therefore we are no ways
concerned in it; we must tell those who have the impudence to insult us
in