ation
of being about the most astute politician in America. Few people
attributed to him the embarrassment of principles. And Cameron, in the
late autumn, after closely observing the drift of things, determined
that Fremont had hit it off correctly, that the crafty thing to do was
to come out for Abolition as a war policy. In a word, he decided to go
over to the Jacobins. He put into his annual report a recommendation of
Chandler's plan for organizing an army of freed slaves and sending it
against the Confederacy. Advanced copies of this report had been sent
to the press before Lincoln knew of it. He peremptorily ordered their
recall, and the exclusion of this suggestion from the text of the
report.(2)

On the heels of this refusal to concede to Chandler one of his cherished
schemes, the second message was sent to Congress. The watchful and
exasperated Jacobins found abundant offense in its omissions. On the
whole great subject of possible emancipation it was blankly silent. The
nearest it came to this subject was one suggestion which applied only
to those captured slaves who had been forfeited by the disloyal owners
through being employed to assist the Confederate government Lincoln
advised that after receiving their freedom they be sent out of the
country and colonized "at some place, or places, in a climate congenial
to them." Beyond this there was nothing bearing on the slavery question
except the admonition--so unsatisfactory to Chandler and all
his sort--that while "the Union must be preserved, and hence all
indispensable means must be employed," Congress should "not be in haste
to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the
loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable."

Lincoln was entirely clear in his own mind that there was but one way
to head off the passion of destruction that was rioting in the Jacobin
temper. "In considering the policy to be adopted in suppressing the
insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable
conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and
remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in every case,
thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the
primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions which
are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of
the Legislature." He persisted in regarding the war as an insurrection
of the "disloyal portion of the Amer