ormula we are making identical
statements. If we are working out a problem in dynamics we meet with
exactly the same principle. We must prove that the resultant accounts
for all the forces in operation at the time. Now, all that the mechanist
claims is that it is extremely probable that one day the scientist will
be able to work out the exact physico-chemical conditions that are the
equivalents of biological phenomena, and, in turn, the
physico-chemical-biological conditions that are the equivalents of
psychological phenomena. Very considerable progress has already been
made in this direction, and, as Sir Oliver Lodge says, there are
probably very few scientific men who would deny the likelihood of this
being done.

But this does not deny the existence of differences between these groups
of phenomena; neither does it assert that we can describe the
characteristic features of one group in terms that belong to another
group. Once a group of phenomena, biological, or chemical is there, we
must have special formulae to describe them, otherwise there would be no
need for these divisions. It is admitted that the earth was at one time
destitute of life; it is also admitted that there are forms of life
destitute of those features which we call mind. And, whatever be their
mode of origin, once introduced they must be dealt with in special
terms. Psychological facts must be expressed in terms of psychology,
biological facts in terms of biology, and chemical facts in terms of
chemistry. You may give the chemical and physical equivalent of a
sunset. That is one aspect. You may also give the psychological
explanation of the emotion of man on beholding it. That is another
aspect. But you cannot express the psychological fact in terms of
chemistry because it belongs to quite another category. A psychological
fact, as such, is ultimate. So is a chemical or a biological fact. If by
analysis you reduce the psychological fact to its chemical and
biological equivalents, its character as a psychological fact is
destroyed. That is the product of the synthesis, and to seek in analysis
for what only exists in synthesis, is surely to altogether misunderstand
the spirit of scientific method. The curious thing is that a mere layman
should have to correct men of science on this matter.

We can now return to Prof. Thomson's attempt to claim for religion a
special place in the sphere of emotion. He claims, in the passage
already cited, that "as th