gle.

It is from a consideration of the nature of pain and pleasure that
we attain the clue to the ultimate duality. Pain and pleasure are
conditions of the soul; conditions which have a definite and quite
fathomable limit. Malice and love are conditions of the soul;
conditions which have no definite limit, but which descend into
unfathomable depths. Extremity of malice sinks down to an abyss
where pain and pleasure are lost and merged in one another.
Extremity of love sinks down to an abyss where pain and pleasure
are lost and merged in one another. But just as, apart from the
individual soul which is their possessor, pain and pleasure have no
existence at all; so, apart from the individual soul which is the
arena of their struggle, malice and love have no existence at all.
Because we speak of pain and pleasure as if they were "things in
themselves" and of malice and love as if they were "things in
themselves" this can never mean more than that they are eternal
conditions of the soul which is their habitation.

Apart from a personal soul, "love" has no meaning and cannot be
said to exist. Apart from a personal soul, "life" has no meaning
and cannot be said to exist. There is no such thing as the
"love-force" or the "life-force," any more than there is such a thing
as the "malice-force" or the "death-force," apart from some personal
soul. The "life-force" is a condition of the soul which carried to an
extreme limit results in ecstasy. The "death-force" is a condition of
the soul which carried to an extreme limit results in ecstasy.
Beyond these two ecstasies there is nothing but total annihilation;
which would simply mean that the soul had become absolutely
"good" or absolutely "evil."

What we call the "death-force" in the soul does not imply real
death, until it has reached a limit beyond ecstasy. It implies a
malignant resistance to life which may be carried to a point of
indescribable exultation. As I have already hinted there is a
profound association between the duality of love and malice and
the duality of pain and pleasure. But it would be false to our
deepest experience to say that love implies pleasure and that
malice implies pain. As a matter of fact, they both imply a thrilling
and ecstatic pleasure, in proportion as the equilibrium between
them, the balance of the wavering struggle between them, is
interrupted by the relative victory of either the one or the other.

The relative victory of malice or o