ity.

This is tantamount to saying that the power of malice is the
strongest instinct in humanity; whereas, if the power of malice had
not already been relatively overcome by the power of love there
would be no "humanity" at all. But the philosophical advocates of
private property do not confine themselves to this malign
insistence upon the basic greediness of human nature. They are in
the habit of twisting their arguments completely around and
speaking of the "rights" of property and of the "wholesome" value
of the "natural instinct" to possess property.

This "natural instinct to possess property" becomes, when they so
defend it, something which we assume to be "good" and "noble,"
and not something which we are compelled to recognize as "evil"
and "base."

It is necessary to keep these two arguments quite separate in our
minds and not to allow the philosophical advocates of private
property to confuse them. If the assumption is that the instinct to
possess property is a "good" instinct, an instinct springing from
the power of love in the human soul, then what we have to do is to
subject this "good instinct" to an inflexible analysis; under the
process of which such "goodness" will be found to transform itself
into the extreme opposite of goodness.

If the assumption is that the instinct to possess property is an evil
instinct, but an instinct which is the strongest of all human
instincts and therefore one which it is insane to attempt to resist,
then what we have to do is to prove that the instinct or the emotion
of love is stronger than the instinct or the emotion of malice and so
essential to the life of the soul that if it had not already relatively
overcome the emotion of malice, the personal soul would never
have become what it has become; in fact would never have existed
at all, since its mere existence depends upon the relative victory of
love over malice.

In dealing with the former of these two arguments, namely that the
instinct to possess property is a "good" instinct, it is advisable to
search for some test of "goodness" which shall carry a stronger
conviction to the mind of such biassed philosophers than any
appeal to the conscience or even to the aesthetic sense. The
conscience and the aesthetic sense speak with uncompromising
finality upon this subject and condemn the possessive instinct or
the instinct to possess property with an unwavering voice. As
eternal aspects of the complex vision, both