xture; nor can it
change it. We may talk of substituting intuition for reason. But the
"new intuition," with its arrogant claims of getting upon the "inner
side" of reality, is after all only "the old reason" functioning with a
franker admission of its reliance upon that immediate personal
vision and with less regard for the logical rules.

It is not, in fact, because of any rule of "logical identity with
itself" that the human mind clings so tenaciously to the notion of an
integral soul-monad. It is because of its own inmost consciousness
that such a monad, that such a substantial integral soul, is in the
deepest sense its very self, and a denial of it a denial of its very
self.

The attitude of Bergson in this matter is much more consistent
than that of James. Bergson is frankly and confessedly not a
pluralist at all, but a spiritual monist. As a spiritual monist he is
compelled to regard what we call "matter," including in this term
the mechanical or chemical resistance of body and brain, as
something which is produced or evolved or "thrown off" by spirit
and as something which, when once it has been evolved, spirit has
to penetrate, permeate, and render porous and submissive.

The complexity of Bergson's speculations with regard to memory
and the "elan vital," with regard above all to the "true time," has
done much to distract popular attention away from his real attitude
towards the soul. But Bergson's attitude towards the existence of a
substantial soul-monad is consistently and inevitably hostile.

It could not be anything else as long as the original personal
"fling" into life which gives each one of us his peculiar angle of
vision remained with him a question of one unified _spirit_--"a
continuum of eternal shooting-forth"--which functioned through
the brain and through all personal life and perpetually created a
new unforeseen universe.

In the flux of this one universal "spirit," whereof "duration," in the
mysterious Bergsonian sense, is the functional activity, there can
obviously be no place for an actual substantial soul. "The
consciousness we have of our own self in its continual flux
introduces us to the interior of a reality on the model of which we
must represent other realities. All reality, therefore, is a tendency,
if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change in any
direction." And when we enquire as to the nature of this "continual
flux" of which the positive and integral thing we hav