the love or the malice which
has been for the moment relatively overcome by its opposite. And
just as pain can be both emotional and sensational so pleasure can
be both emotional and sensational. Pleasure, like pain, can be a
thing of bodily sensation alone; in which case it tends to become a
thing of degrading and humiliating reality. A human entity entirely
obsessed by physical pleasure is a revolting and obscene spectacle.
Even with animals it is only when their sensation of pleasure is in
some degree emotionalized that we can endure to contemplate it
with sympathy.

The soul of an animal is capable of being "de-animalized" in just
as horrible a way by a pure sensation as the soul of a man is
capable of being "de-humanized" by a pure sensation. The sexual
sensation of pleasure carried to the extreme limit "de-animalizes"
animals as it "de-humanizes" human beings; because it drowns the
consciousness of personality. There is an ecstasy when personality
loses itself and finds itself again in a deeper personality. There is
also an ecstasy where personality loses itself in pure sensation. In
the region of sexual sensation, just as in the region of sexual
emotion, it is love alone which is able to hold fast to personality in
the midst of ecstasy; or which is able to merge personality in a
deeper personality.

It is because of love's intimate association with pain that we are
unable, except under the morbid pressure of some metaphysical or
religious illusion, to regard the imaginary "parent of the universe"
with anything but hostility. Both pain and pleasure are associated
with the unfathomable duality. And although the unfathomable
duality descends into abysses beyond the reach of both of these,
yet we cannot conceive of either of them existing apart from this
struggle.

But there can be no duality, as there can be no struggle, in the
soul of a being in whom love has absolutely overcome malice.
Therefore in such a soul there can be no pain. And for a soul
incapable of feeling pain we can feel no love. It is of course
obvious that this whole problem is an imaginary one. We are not
really confronted with the alternative of loving or hating the
unruffled soul of this absolute one. And we are not confronted
with this problem for the simple reason that such a soul does not
exist. And it does not exist because every soul, together with the
"universe" created by every soul, depends for its existence upon
this ultimate strug