gned his seat in the House, having been elected as a member of
the Senate from Kentucky, and remained in the Senate until he
resigned to accept the position of Secretary of the Treasury under
Cleveland.

Mr. Carlisle was in entire harmony with the President on the tariff
and also on the monetary questions--and, indeed, I remark here that
Mr. Carlisle had very much to do toward the defeat of Mr. Bryan in
1896. Although a life-long Democrat himself, he believed that Mr.
Bryan's theories on the monetary question would ruin the country,
and he stood with Mr. Cleveland in opposing his election. Had
Cleveland, Carlisle, and other patriotic Gold Democrats stood with
their party, Mr. Bryan would probably have been elected and the
history of this country would have been written differently.

After Mr. Cleveland's election, our industrial conditions became
so depressed--and it was alleged by many that the cause for this
was the Sherman Coinage Act of 1890--that a special session of
Congress was called to meet August 7, 1893. The President said in
his message to this Congress:

"The existence of an alarming and extraordinary business situation,
involving the welfare and prosperity of all our people, has
constrained me to call in extra session the people's representatives
in Congress, to the end that through a wise and patriotic exercise
fo the legislative duty with which they are solely charged, present
evils may be mitigated and danger threatening the future may be
averted. . . . With plenteous crops, with abundant promise of
remunerative production and manufacture, with unusual invitation
to safe investment, and with satisfactory returns to business
enterprise, suddenly financial fear and distrust have sprung up on
every side. . . . Values supposed to be fixed are fast becoming
conjectural, and loss and failure have involved every branch of
business. I believe these things are principally chargeable to
Congressional legislation touching the purchase and coinage of
silver by the general Government."

And Mr. Cleveland earnestly recommended the prompt repeal of the
Sherman Coinage Act of 1890.

The extra session continued until October 30, when the Sherman Act
was finally repealed.

But the repeal of the Sherman Act did not at all remedy industrial
conditions. It was not the Sherman Act that was at fault, but the
well-grounded fear on the part of our manufacturers of the passage
of a free trade measure. The panic co