lack units to be formed and
even provided for a wide distribution of the units among all the arms
and services except the Army Air Forces and Signal Corps, but they did
not explain how the skilled Negro, whose numbers had greatly increased
since World War I, could be efficiently used within the limitations of
black units. In the name of military efficiency the Army staff had, in
effect, devised a social rather than a military policy for the
employment of black troops.
[Footnote 2-1: This survey of the Army and the Negro
in World War II is based principally on Lee's
_Employment of Negro Troops_. A comprehensive
account of the development of policy, the
mobilization of black soldiers, and their use in
the various theaters and units of World War II,
this book is an indispensable source for any
serious student of the subject.]
[Footnote 2-2: For examples of how World War I
military experiences affected the thinking of the
civil rights advocates and military traditionalists
of World War II, see Lester B. Granger Oral History
Interview, 1960, Columbia University Oral History
Collection; Interview, Lee Nichols with Lt. Gen.
John C. H. Lee (c. 1953). For the influence of
World War II on a major contributor to postwar
racial policy, see Interview, Lee Nichols with
Harry S. Truman, 24 Jun 53. Last two in Nichols
Collection, CMH. These interviews are among many
compiled by Nichols as part of his program
associated with the production of _Breakthrough on
the Color Front_ (New York: Random House, 1954).
Nichols, a journalist, presented this collection of
interviews, along with other documents and
materials, to the Center of Military History in
1972. The interviews have proved to be a valuable
supplement to the official record. They capture the
thoughts of a number of important participants,
some no longer alive, at a time relatively close to
the events under considerati
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