e overt discrimination in
the wartime Army. At the same time, he rejected the idea that the Army
should take the lead in altering the racial mores of the nation. Asked
for his views on Hastie's "carefully prepared memo,"[2-9] General
Marshall admitted that many of the recommendations were sound but said
that Judge Hastie's proposals

would be tantamount to solving a social problem which has
perplexed the American people throughout the history of this
nation. The Army cannot accomplish such a solution and (p. 022)
should not be charged with the undertaking. The settlement of
vexing racial problems cannot be permitted to complicate the
tremendous task of the War Department and thereby jeopardize
discipline and morale.[2-10]

[Footnote 2-9: Memo, USW for CofS, 6 Oct 41,
G-1/15640-120.]

[Footnote 2-10: Memo, CofS for SW, 1 Dec 41, sub:
Report of Judge William H. Hastie, Civilian Aide to
the Secretary of War, dated 22 Sep 41, OCS
20602-219.]

As Chief of Staff, Marshall faced the tremendous task of creating in
haste a large Army to deal with the Axis menace. Since for several
practical reasons the bulk of that Army would be trained in the south
where its conscripts would be subject to southern laws, Marshall saw
no alternative but to postpone reform. The War Department, he said,
could not ignore the social relationship between blacks and whites,
established by custom and habit. Nor could it ignore the fact that the
"level of intelligence and occupational skill" of the black population
was considerably below that of whites. Though he agreed that the Army
would reach maximum strength only if individuals were placed according
to their abilities, he concluded that experiments to solve social
problems would be "fraught with danger to efficiency, discipline, and
morale." In sum, Marshall saw no reason to change the policy approved
by the President less than a year before.[2-11]

[Footnote 2-11: Ibid. See also Forrest C. Pogue,
_George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory_ (New
York: The Viking Press, 1973), pp. 96-99.]

The Army's leaders and the secretary's civilian aide had reached an
impasse on the question of policy even before the country entered the
war. And though the use of black troops in World War I was not