was
ever perpetrated on the youth of the South." To all such complaints
the War Department answered that separation was not always possible
because of the small number of Negroes involved.[2-96]

[Footnote 2-96: Ltr, Horace Wilkinson to Rep. John J.
Sparkman (Alabama), 24 Aug 43; Ltr, TAG to Rep.
John Starnes (Alabama), 15 Sep 43. Both in AG 095
(Wilkinson) (28 Aug 43). See also Interv, Nichols
with Ulysses Lee, 1953.]

In answering these complaints the Army developed its ultimate
justification for integrated officer schools: integration was
necessary on the grounds of efficiency and economy. As one Army
spokesman put it, "our objection to separate schools is based (p. 051)
primarily on the fact that black officer candidates are eligible
from every branch of the Army, including the Armored Force and tank
destroyer battalions, and it would be decidedly uneconomical to
attempt to gather in one school the materiel and instructor personnel
necessary to give training in all these branches."[2-97]

[Footnote 2-97: Ltr, SGS to Sen. Carl Hayden
(Arizona), 12 Dec 41, AG 352 (12-12-41). See also
Memo, ACofS, G-3, for CofS, 23 Oct 41, sub: Negro
Officer Candidate Schools, G-3/43276.]

Officer candidate training was the Army's first formal experiment with
integration. Many blacks and whites lived together with a minimum of
friction, and, except in flight school, all candidates trained
together.[2-98] Yet in some schools the number of black officer
candidates made racially separate rooms feasible, and Negroes were
usually billeted and messed together. In other instances Army
organizations were slow to integrate their officer training. The
Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, for example, segregated black candidates
until late 1942 when Judge Hastie brought the matter to McCloy's
attention.[2-99] Nevertheless, the Army's experiment was far more
important than its immediate results indicated. It proved that even in
the face of considerable opposition the Army was willing to abandon
its segregation policy when the issues of economy and efficiency were
made sufficiently clear and compelling.

[Footnote 2-98: Dollard and Young, "In the Armed
Forces."]

[Footnote 2-99: Memos, Hastie for ASW, 4 Nov 42 and