eve that there is any immediate danger of a war as a
result of the seizure of Kiao-Chou, and he adds that the present
excitement may be "for the purpose of finding out just what the
pretensions of the various Powers are with regard to China."

"The attitude of Great Britain," he writes, "is one requiring close
examination, because of the magnitude and far-reaching character of her
demands on China. Briefly stated, they are:

"First, that China shall accept a loan guaranteed by Great Britain;
secondly, that as security the customs administration shall be placed
under her agents, with a contingent control of the _likin_ or internal
customs; thirdly, the right to push the Burmese railways at once into
Yunnan and Sechuen; and, fourthly, that no cessions of territory shall
be made to any other power south of the Yang-tse-kiang."

The immense importance of these demands the writer very clearly
explains.

[Illustration: WESTERN GATE, PEKIN, CHINA.]

If England were to grant China the enormous loan that she needs to pay
the war indemnity to Japan, she would secure "a controlling voice in
all future financial transactions which the Chinese Government might
wish or be forced to undertake."

If China agreed to the second proposition, England could manage the
customs in such a way as to "attract the vast bulk of the internal trade
of China to herself."

He writes further:

"The third and fourth demands hang together, but have to be treated
separately. The concession to Great Britain of the unrestricted right to
construct railways from Burmah into the southwestern provinces of China
would have the effect of turning them into commercial tributaries of
Great Britain.

"A railway connecting Rangoon in Burmah by way of Bhamo with Ichang at
the head of navigation on the Yang-tse-kiang would act as a suction pipe
to draw away to the port of Rangoon the trade of the most prosperous and
flourishing parts of China, and give products taking that route the
advantage of many days in point of time and of distance in the race for
the European markets. By just so much trade as might take the British
route through Burmah, would the potential trade of other Powers, with no
other but all sea routes from the coast at their command, be diminished.

"The advantage British manufactures would have for entry and
distribution into the vast and populous regions which the British
Government proposes to penetrate by means of railways constructed by