els me to make a few concluding remarks.

The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed,
have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a
collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this
object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed
that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was
determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the
attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered
correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain
was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for
war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance
on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this
crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the
concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable
moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait
until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and
Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the
other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it
can actively support the Rhine army.

This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government,
but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined,
that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes.

It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as
regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our
manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of
territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not
inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in
obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the
possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can
never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were
compelled to abandon.

I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial
concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed
force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo
region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of
November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their
present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they