rise again
in the flesh and live for ever in Ezekiel's New Jerusalem, with its
ceremonial glories and civic order. It would be truly agreeable for any
man to sit in well-watered gardens with Mohammed, clad in green silks,
drinking delicious sherbets, and transfixed by the gazelle-like glance
of some young girl, all innocence and fire. Amid such scenes a man might
remain himself and might fulfil hopes that he had actually cherished on
earth. He might also find his friends again, which in somewhat generous
minds is perhaps the thought that chiefly sustains interest in a
posthumous existence. But to recognise his friends a man must find them
in their bodies, with their familiar habits, voices, and interests; for
it is surely an insult to affection to say that he could find them in an
eternal formula expressing their idiosyncrasy. When, however, it is
clearly seen that another life, to supplement this one, must closely
resemble it, does not the magic of immortality altogether vanish? Is
such a reduplication of earthly society at all credible? And the
prospect of awakening again among houses and trees, among children and
dotards, among wars and rumours of wars, still fettered to one
personality and one accidental past, still uncertain of the future, is
not this prospect wearisome and deeply repulsive? Having passed through
these things once and bequeathed them to posterity, is it not time for
each soul to rest? The universe doubtless contains all sorts of
experiences, better and worse than the human; but it is idle to
attribute to a particular man a life divorced from his circumstances and
from his body.

[Sidenote: Arguments from retribution and need of opportunity.]

Dogmas about such a posthumous experience find some shadowy support in
various illusions and superstitions that surround death, but they are
developed into articulate prophecies chiefly by certain moral demands.
One of these requires rewards and punishments more emphatic and sure
than those which conduct meets with in this world. Another requires
merely a more favourable and complete opportunity for the soul's
development. Considerations like these are pertinent to moral
philosophy. It touches the notion of duty whether an exact hedonistic
retribution is to be demanded for what is termed merit and guilt: so
that without such supernatural remuneration virtue, perhaps, would be
discredited and deprived of a motive. It likewise touches the ideality
and noblenes