hereby outraged in others and ultimately
also in one's self. On the other hand lies mystical disintegration,
which leads men to feel so keenly the rights of everything in particular
and of the All in general, that they retain no hearty allegiance to any
human interest. Between these two abysses winds the narrow path of
charity and valour. The ultimate ideal is absolutely authoritative,
because if any ground were found to relax allegiance to it in any degree
or for any consideration, that ground would itself be the ideal, found
to be more nearly absolute and ultimate than the one, hastily so called,
which it corrected. The ultimate ideal, in order to maintain its
finality and preclude the possibility of an appeal which should dislodge
it from its place of authority, must have taken all interests into
consideration; it must be universally representative. Now, to take an
interest into consideration and represent it means to intend, as far as
possible, to secure the particular good which that particular interest
looks to, and never, whatever measures may be adopted, to cease to look
back on the elementary impulse as upon something which ought, if
possible, to have been satisfied, and which we should still go back and
satisfy now, if circumstances and the claims of rival interests
permitted.

Justice and charity are identical. To deny the initial right of any
impulse is not morality but fanaticism. However determined may be the
prohibition which reason opposes to some wild instinct, that prohibition
is never reckless; it is never inconsiderate of the very impulse which
it suppresses. It suppresses that impulse unwillingly, pitifully, under
stress of compulsion and _force majeure_; for reason, in representing
this impulse in the context of life and in relation to every other
impulse which, in its operation, it would affect mechanically, rejects
and condemns it; but it condemns it not by antecedent hate but by
supervening wisdom. The texture of the natural world, the conflict of
interests in the soul and in society, all of which cannot be satisfied
together, is accordingly the ground for moral restrictions and
compromises. Whatever the up-shot of the struggle may be, whatever the
verdict pronounced by reason, the parties to the suit must in justice
all be heard, and heard sympathetically.

[Sidenote: Primary and secondary morality.]

Herein lies the great difference between first-hand and second-hand
morality. The retailers