oats
on the river for seventy miles were either destroyed or in the hands of
Washington. This successful retreat from the Hudson over the Delaware
was another exhibition of high military qualities,--caution, quick
perception, and prompt action.
Washington had now the nucleus of an army and could not be dislodged by
the enemy, whose force was only about double his own. Howe was
apparently satisfied with driving the American forces out of New Jersey,
and, retaining his hold at certain points, sent the bulk of his army
back to New York.
The aim of Washington was now to expel the British troops from New
Jersey. It was almost a forlorn hope, but he never despaired. His
condition was not more hopeless than that of William the Silent when he
encountered the overwhelming armies of Spain. Always beaten, the heroic
Prince of Orange still held out when Holland was completely overrun. But
the United States were not overrun. New England was practically safe,
although the British held Newport; and all the country south of the
Delaware was free from them. The perplexities and discouragements of
Washington were great indeed, while he stubbornly held the field with a
beggarly makeshift for an army and sturdily continued his appeals to
Congress and to the country for men, arms, and clothing; yet only New
York City and New Jersey were really in the possession of the enemy. It
was one thing for England to occupy a few cities, and quite another to
conquer a continent; hence Congress and the leaders of the rebellion
never lost hope. So long as there were men left in peaceable possession
of their farms from Maine to Georgia, and these men accustomed to
fire-arms and resolved on freedom, there was no real cause of despair.
The perplexing and discouraging things were that the men preferred the
safety and comfort of their homes to the dangers and hardships of the
camp, and that there was no money in the treasury to pay the troops, nor
credit on which to raise it. Hence desertions, raggedness, discontent,
suffering; but not despair,--even in the breast of Washington, who
realized the difficulties as none else did. Men would not enlist unless
they were paid and fed, clothed and properly armed. Had there been an
overwhelming danger they probably would have rallied, as the Dutch did
when they opened their dikes, or as the Greeks rallied in their late
Revolution, when fortress after fortress fell into the hands of the
Turks, and as the American m
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