r comes into being in another must have parts, and
then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that
which has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly
within nor wholly without anything.

True.

And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no
parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot
come into being either as a part or as a whole?

Clearly.

Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, nor by
going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change
in itself?

Very true.

Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?

Immoveable.

But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?

Yes, we said so.

Then it is never in the same?

Why not?

Because if it were in the same it would be in something.

Certainly.

And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?

True.

Then one is never in the same place?

It would seem not.

But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?

Never.

One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?

It certainly appears so.

Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than
itself or other.

How is that?

If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.

True.

And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so
that upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but
would be other than one?

It would.

Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?

It will not.

Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one,
but only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.

True.

Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?

Certainly not.

But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not
by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will
not be other than anything?

Right.

Neither will one be the same with itself.

How not?

Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.

Why not?

It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes
one.

What of that?

Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many
and not one.

True.

But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a
thing became the same, it wo