o either one of their affections, they will
be like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of
them together, most opposed and most unlike.
That appears to be true.
Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
True.
And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion
and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be
proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have
experienced the affections aforesaid?
True.
1.bb. Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these
matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the
one is, whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the
others.
By all means.
Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections
of the others?
Let us ask that question.
Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the
one?
Why so?
Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from
both of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all
things.
Yes, all things.
Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in
which both the one and the others might exist?
There is nothing.
Then the one and the others are never in the same?
True.
Then they are separated from each other?
Yes.
And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?
Impossible.
Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be
separated from the others, and has no parts?
Impossible.
Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they
do not partake either in whole or in part?
It would seem not.
Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves
any unity?
There is not.
Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would
be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of
the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.
True.
Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely
deprived of the one?
True.
Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness
and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them
likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to
one another.
That is clear.
But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two thi
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