en the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of
a straight or of a circular form?

Assuredly.

But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?

Right.

And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be
either in another or in itself.

How so?

Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which
it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that
which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature,
cannot be touched all round in many places.

Certainly not.

But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be
contained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really
in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.

Impossible.

But then, that which contains must be other than that which is
contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if
so, one will be no longer one, but two?

True.

Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?

No.

Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either
rest or motion.

Why not?

Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place
or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.

Yes.

And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any
longer one.

It cannot.

It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of
nature?

Clearly not.

Then can the motion of the one be in place?

Perhaps.

But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round
in the same place, or from one place to another?

It must.

And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which
goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the
centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be
carried round upon a centre?

Impossible.

But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?

Perhaps so, if it moves at all.

And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?

Yes.

Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it
not?

I do not see why.

Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither
as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be
altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.

Certainly not.

And therefore whateve