ress on the subject of
naturalization, and subversive of the Federal powers. I regret that
any countenance should be given from this bench to a practice like
this in some of the States, which has no warrant in the Constitution.

In the argument, it was said that a colored citizen would not be an
agreeable member of society. This is more a matter of taste than of
law. Several of the States have admitted persons of color to the right
of suffrage, and in this view have recognised them as citizens; and
this has been done in the slave as well as the free States. On the
question of citizenship, it must be admitted that we have not been
very fastidious. Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have made
citizens of all grades, combinations, and colors. The same was done in
the admission of Louisiana and Florida. No one ever doubted, and no
court ever held, that the people of these Territories did not become
citizens under the treaty. They have exercised all the rights of
citizens, without being naturalized under the acts of Congress.

There are several important principles involved in this case, which
have been argued, and which may be considered under the following
heads:

1. The locality of slavery, as settled by this court and the courts of
the States.

2. The relation which the Federal Government bears to slavery in the
States.

3. The power of Congress to establish Territorial Governments, and to
prohibit the introduction of slavery therein.

4. The effect of taking slaves into a new State or Territory, and so
holding them, where slavery is prohibited.

5. Whether the return of a slave under the control of his master,
after being entitled to his freedom, reduces him to his former
condition.

6. Are the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, on the
questions before us, binding on this court, within the rule adopted.

In the course of my judicial duties, I have had occasion to consider
and decide several of the above points.

1. As to the locality of slavery. The civil law throughout the
Continent of Europe, it is believed, without an exception, is, that
slavery can exist only within the territory where it is established;
and that, if a slave escapes, or is carried beyond such territory, his
master cannot reclaim him, unless by virtue of some express
stipulation. (Grotius, lib. 2, chap. 15, 5, 1; lib. 10, chap. 10, 2,
1; Wicqueposts Ambassador, lib. 1, p. 418; 4 Martin, 385; Case of the
Creole in the House o