ou? You are not going to reprove
or punish him, or exact anything from him. Why should he not tell you
everything as frankly as to his little playmate? He sees no more
danger in the one case than in the other.

The falsehood of right is still less natural to children, because
promises to do or not to do are conventional acts, foreign to our
nature and infringements of our liberty. Besides, all the engagements
of children are in themselves void, because, as their limited vision
does not stretch beyond the present, they know not what they do when
they bind themselves. It is hardly possible for a child to tell a lie
in making a promise. For, considering only how to overcome a present
difficulty, all devices that have no immediate effect become alike to
him. In promising for a time to come he actually does not promise at
all, as his still dormant imagination cannot extend itself over two
different periods of time. If he could escape a whipping or earn some
sugar-plums by promising to throw himself out of the window to-morrow,
he would at once promise it. Therefore the laws pay no regard to
engagements made by children; and when some fathers and teachers, more
strict than this, require the fulfilling of such engagements, it is
only in things the child ought to do without promising.

As the child in making a promise is not aware what he is doing, he
cannot be guilty of falsehood in so doing: but this is not the case
when he breaks a promise. For he well remembers having made the
promise; what he cannot understand is, the importance of keeping it.
Unable to read the future, he does not foresee the consequences of his
actions; and when he violates engagements he does nothing contrary to
what might be expected of his years.

It follows from this that all the untruths spoken by children are the
fault of those who instruct them; and that endeavoring to teach them
how to be truthful is only teaching them how to tell falsehoods. We
are so eager to regulate, to govern, to instruct them, that we never
find means enough to reach our object. We want to win new victories
over their minds by maxims not based upon fact, by unreasonable
precepts; we would rather they should know their lessons and tell lies
than to remain ignorant and speak the truth.

As for us, who give our pupils none but practical teaching, and would
rather have them good than knowing, we shall not exact the truth from
them at all, lest they disguise it;