hese two divisions of abstract thought to
the same formal types. His labors have not yet borne fruit in proportion
to their value, and they are, I believe, comparatively little known. But
in the future they will be regarded as epochal in the science of mind.
They make us to see the same law governing mind and matter, thought and
extension.
Not the least important result thus achieved was in emphasizing the
contrast between the natural laws of mental association, and the laws of
thinking which are the foundation of the syllogism.
By attending to this distinction we are enabled to keep the form and the
matter of thought well apart--a neglect to do which, or rather a studied
attempt to ignore which, is the radical error of the logic devised by
Hegel, as I shall show more fully a little later.
All applied logic, inductive as well as deductive, is based on formal
logic, and this in turn on the "laws of thought," or rather of thinking.
These are strictly regulative or abstract, and differ altogether from
the natural laws of thought, such as those of similarity, contiguity and
harmony, as well as from the rules of applied logic, such as those of
agreement and difference. The fundamental laws of thinking are three in
number, and their bearing on all the higher questions of religious
philosophy is so immediate that their consideration becomes of the last
moment in such a study as this. They are called the laws of
Determination, Limitation and Excluded Middle.
The first affirms that every object thought about must be conceived as
itself, and not as some other thing. "A is A," or "_x_ = _x_," is its
formal expression. This teaches us that whatever we think of, must be
thought as one or a unity. It is important, however, to note that this
does not mean a mathematical unit, but a logical one, that is, identity
and not contrast. So true is this that in mathematical logic the only
value which can satisfy the formula is a concept which does not admit of
increase, to wit, a Universal.
From this necessity of conceiving a thought under unity has arisen the
interesting tendency, so frequently observable even in early times, to
speak of the universe as one whole, the ~to pan~ of the Greek
philosophers; and also the monotheistic leaning of all thinkers, no
matter what their creed, who have attained very general conceptions.
Furthermore, the strong liability of confounding this speculative or
logical unity with the concrete notion o
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