nd them very
different from those of physical necessity--those which are called the
laws of nature. The latter are authoritative, they are never means to an
end, they admit no exception, they leave no room for error. Not so with
the laws of reasoning. Man far more frequently disregards than obeys
them; they leave a wide field for fallacy. Wherein then lies that
theoretical necessity which is the essence of law? The answer is that
the laws of reasoning are _purposive_ only, they are regulative, not
constitutive, and their theoretical necessity lies in the end, the
result of reasoning, that is, in the knowing, in the recognition of
truth. They are what the Germans call _Zweckgesetze_.[108-1]
But in mathematical reasoning and in the processes of physical nature
the absolute character of the laws which prevail depends for its final
necessity on their consistency, their entire correspondence with the
laws of right reasoning. Applied to them the purposive character of the
laws is not seen, for their ends are fulfilled. We are brought,
therefore, to the momentous conclusion that the manifestation of Order,
whether in material or mental processes, "affords a presumption, not
measurable indeed but real, of the fulfilment of an end or
purpose;"[108-1][TN-7] and this purpose, one which has other objects in
view than the continuance of physical processes. The history of mind,
from protoplasmic sensation upward, must be a progression, whose end
will be worth more than was its beginning, a process, which has for its
purpose the satisfaction of the laws of mind. This is nothing else than
correct thinking, the attainment of truth.
But this conclusion, reached by a searching criticism of the validity of
scientific laws, is precisely that which is the postulate of all
developed creeds. "The faith of all historical religions," says Bunsen,
"starts from the assumption of a universal moral order, in which the
good is alone the true, and the true is the only good."[109-1]
The purposive nature of the processes of thought, as well as the manner
in which they govern the mind, is illustrated by the history of man. His
actions, whether as an individual or as a nation, are guided by ideas
not derived from the outer world, for they do not correspond to actual
objects, but from mental pictures of things as he wants them to exist.
These are his hopes, his wishes, his ideals; they are the more potent,
and prompt to more vigorous action, the clear
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